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Market effects associated with different financial restatements announcement 





Canadian firms generally use one of two different announcement strategies when they 
detect the possible need to issue financial restatements; namely: single-announcement 
restatements (directly uploading and disclosing the financial restatements) and 
multiple-announcement restatements (initially announcing the possibility of 
accounting problems through press releases or firm reports before the later issue of 
the final restatements). We find that error-related single-announcement financial 
restatements are associated with significant negative market impacts in a two day 
event window [0, +1]. The median idiosyncratic volatility associated with error-
related single-announcement restatements increases significantly following the 
announcements. For multiple-announcement restatements we observe significant 
market impacts at the intention announcement day and additional market impacts 
prior to but not on the official restatement dates. In the in-between period after the 
intention to restate is announced, bid-ask spreads increase and trading volumes, 
trading values and the idiosyncratic volatilities decrease significantly. After the 
official restatement is announced, trading volumes, trading values and idiosyncratic 
volatilities increase significantly. We observe higher total market impacts for multiple 
versus single announcement financial restatements. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
      Financial restatements may convey information to investors about a firm’s expected cash 
flows and about the uncertainty or quality of those future cash flows based on the perceived 
quality of their corporate governance (Kryzanowski and Zhang, 2013b). Restatement types 
include those that are error-related or are due to a change in accounting regulations or are due to 
specific events such as discontinued operations, stock splits, stock dividends, and M&As.  
Previous research focuses mainly on error-related restatements because the other two types of 
restatements are perceived as being the result of the regular operations of companies. Various 
sources of agency problems (such as managerial compensation and earnings manipulation) can 
be the triggers for error-related financial misstatements (Richardson et al., 2002; Burns and 
Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Burns et al., 2010; Ettredge et al., 2010; and Zhang, 2012).  
 In this research we examine the market effects of announcements for the three types of 
financial restatements during the 2007-2013 period for firms listed on the TSX and TSX-V.  We 
find significant mean price effects for two-day announcement windows [0, +1] only for error-
related financial restatements. The mean price effects of -0.45 percent and -5.89 percent for TSX 
and TSX-V listed firms, respectively, are consistent with those reported in previous studies, 
which range from -4% to -12% depending on their type (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Turner et al., 
2001; Anderson et al., 2002; Wu, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004).  We also find that the three types 
of Canadian restatements have no significant effects on bid-ask spreads, trading volumes and 
trading values. The spread results are consistent with the findings of Palmrose et al. (2004) and 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013a) for revenue-recognition restatements.  
      Not all restatement announcements are single events. When companies suspect that they may 
need to restate, they may initially announce the possibility of accounting problems through press 
releases or firm reports and may adopt a series of investigations before they issue a press release 
 - 2 - 
 
detailing the final restatement results (Scholz, 2008). Schmidt and Wilkins (2012) also find that 
companies with more financial experts on the audit committee have shorter in-between periods 
(referred to as the dark period in their period), but only when such financial expertise relates 
specifically to accounting. Since the first announcement of a possible restatement only provides 
incomplete information to investors, we make an initial test of the market effects of intention 
announcements. We find a significant negative impact of -2.87 percent for the two-day window 
[0, +1] for intention announcements. Since market uncertainty may remain until the issue of the 
official restatement press release, we examine market behavior between these two 
announcements, which we refer to as the in-between period. During the in-between period, bid-
ask spreads increase and trading volumes, trading values and idiosyncratic volatilities decrease. 
We also find a further significantly negative impact of -3.42 percent during the in-between 
period. On the day upon which full restatement information is released, we find no significant 
price effects although trading volumes, trading values and idiosyncratic volatilities significantly 
increase. We find significantly greater cumulative price effects associated with multiple versus 
single announcement financial restatements.  
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Financial Restatement Announcement Process 
Scholz (2008) describes the various steps that may occur in the public disclosure of a financial 
restatement. The announcement process may begin with the announcement of actual or potential 
accounting problems in a press release or companies’ current report and conclude with the 
release of the amended results. She points out that the time elapsed during this announcement 
period will vary significantly because companies might adopt investigations and updates during 
the interim periods. However, in her examination of the market impact of financial restatements, 
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Scholz (2008) examines the combined effect of all announcements in the announcement process 
and not the individual announcements.  
2.2 Likelihood to Financial Restate 
2.2.1 Likelihood to financial restate: U.S. evidence 
 Normally a publicly traded firm restates its financial statements if the previous statements 
contain material errors. Richardson et al. (2002) find that firms with high market expectations for 
future growth in earnings and with higher levels of outstanding debt are more likely to restate. 
They argue that companies are motivated to adopt aggressive accounting policies mainly due to 
capital market pressures.  
 Thompson and Larson (2004) find that larger firms are more likely to financially restate than 
smaller firms. In contrast, Turner and Weirich (2006) report that small firms are twice as likely 
to restate as big firms, and that companies audited by small audit firms are six times as likely to 
announce restatements as companies audited by the Big Four. Aggregate institutional ownership 
is positively related to the likelihood and severity of misreporting (Burns et al., 2010). Also, 
managers may take actions to support the stock price when the stock is substantially overvalued 
(Efendi et al., 2007). 
 According to Burns and Kedia (2006), CEO compensation packages, especially the option 
component, can significantly influence the adoption of aggressive accounting behaviour which 
can lead to subsequent financial restatements. Harris and Bromiley (2007) report support for the 
theory that pressures from executive inducements and poor firm performance can cause firms to 
act unethically. Ettredge et al. (2010) also argue that intentional earnings management can lead 
to restatements. Baber et al. (2012) show that the relation between the probability of restatement 
and governance measures are statistically significant only when interactions between internal and 
external governance measures are considered as both main effects and interactions. 
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2.2.2 Likelihood to financial restate: Canadian evidence 
 While Canada has similar regulatory principles to the U.S. (Nicholls, 2006; King and Santor, 
2008), the majority of Canadian pubic firms are concentrated in a few industries (such as natural 
and energy resources) and are controlled by families. Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013b) argue that 
the market and other effects of Canadian restatements due to SOX may differ from that for U.S. 
restatements due to different roots (e.g., more concentrated ownership and smaller size) and 
different routes (principle- versus rule-based regulation). Anand et al. (2012) find that Canadian 
firms, even if they are not cross-listed in the U.S., are more willing to adopt U.S. standards such 
as SOX.  According to Nicholls (2006) and Ben-Ishai (2008), a number of regulatory principles 
have been placed in practice in Canada in response to SOX to enhance corporate governance for 
Canadian firms. 
 Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013b) document that Canadian companies are less likely to restate 
if they have bigger blockholder and management ownerships, audit committees with at least one 
director with financial expertise, a lower leverage ratio, and a big 5 auditor. They also find that 
the likelihood of a financial restatement is not significantly related to the proportion of unrelated 
directors and whether CEOs are in the chair position of the board or are from the founding 
family. Moreover, in contrast to Burns and Kedia (2006) and Harris and Bromiley (2007), Zhang 
(2012) finds that the higher sensitivity of option values (total, vested and unvested), and in-the–
money-stocks and long-term incentive payouts of top executives, CEOs and CFOs does not 
significantly affect the likelihood of restatements by Canadian firms.  But for top executives, 
CEOs and CFOs, the motivations from restricted stock are associated with the size of 
restatements and the higher CFO equity holdings are associated with larger restatements. 
2.3 Consequences of Financial Restatements 
2.3.1 Consequences of financial restatements: US evidence 
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 According to Callen et al. (2006), restatements are associated with negative market reactions 
since the restatements may reveal information that: 1) causes a downward revision of future cash 
flow prospects; 2) exposes weak accounting management and even managerial problems in the 
restating firms; and 3) signals that the opportunistic behavior of managements who may enhance 
profits from not only aggressive accounting but through illegal means. 
 Restatement announcements are associated with, on average, negative price impacts ranging 
from -4 percent to -12 percent depending on their type (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996; Turner et al., 
2001; Anderson et al., 2002; Wu, 2002; Palmrose et al., 2004). Palmrose et al. (2004) find that 
firms restating more material misstatements suffer more severe price reactions.  Hennes et al. 
(2008) report that restatements correcting irregularities are associated with a 14 percent negative 
price impact while restatements correcting errors are associated only with a 2 percent negative 
price impact. Anderson and Yohn (2002) find that markets react more negatively to restatements 
involving revenue recognition problems than other reporting errors. Moreover, Gleason et al. 
(2008) find that financial restatements, especially for revenue recognition, that adversely may 
influence shareholder wealth at the restating firm also lead share prices to decrease among non-
restating firms in the same industry. In contrast, Callen et al. (2006) report that income-
increasing restatements due to errors or changes in accounting principles are not associated with 
significant price impacts. Furthermore, the firms with higher levels of transient institutional 
ownership have more severe price impacts due to the restatements (Hribar et al., 2004). Gordon 
et al. (2008) document that disclosure credibility, which is defined as believability of the 
disclosures to broadly encompass its fairness of representation from an investor’s perspective, is 
an important determinant of market reactions to restatements. Wilson (2008) finds that the 
duration of the loss is larger for revenue recognition errors by restating firms. He also finds 
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support for the conjecture that short-term declines in the confidence of investors follow the 
restatements. 
 The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which set new or enhanced standards in the U.S. for 
financial reporting and control, increased the number of financial restatements. If SOX increased 
the responsibilities of management in financial reporting, Burks (2007, 2010) argues that post-
SOX financial restatements should be associated with significantly less negative returns than pre-
SOX financial restatements. Hranaiova and Byers (2007) report that the negative influence of 
restatements is reduced by 71 percent in the post- versus pre-SOX period. Furthermore, the 
volatility of post-announcement abnormal returns was significantly lower in the post-SOX 
period.  
 Griffin (2003) finds that the number of analysts covering a firm declines significantly in the 
first month after a corrective disclosure, and that analysts are more likely to lower their 
predictions associated with such bad news in the first half of the year. Li and Zhang (2006) find 
net insider selling in the pre-restatement period, little net insider selling immediately around the 
restatements and net insider buying in the post-restatement period. This behavior suggests that 
insiders can trade on information to be revealed in forthcoming restatements by avoiding 
allegations of improper behavior.  
 Hribar and Jenkins (2004) find that restatements are associated with subsequent decreases in 
expected future earnings and increases in the cost of equity capital. Hirschey et al. (2003) detect 
a statistically significant post-earnings announcement drift following restatements which they 
attribute to investor under-reaction following the restatements. 
     Chen et al. (2014) find that in the year following the restatement announcements, the 
announcing of financial statements from companies associated with negative market reactions to 
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the restatements become more conservative and the market reactions following restatement 
announcements are getting more severe. Chi and Sun (2014) find a negative relationship between 
the probability of financial statement reoccurrence and (1) auditor changes to a Big 4 auditor, (2) 
replacements of CEO/CFO, and (3) improvements in internal controls. Amel-Zadeh and Zhang 
(2014) find that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to 
become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms and that 
the takeover bids to those restating firms are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to 
complete. They attribute these findings to the information risk associated with restating 
companies. Ettredge et al. (2013) find that the executives of restating firms exhibit risk-averting 
forecasting behaviors post-restatement.  
 Graham et al. (2008) find that restating firms normally pay more upfront and annual fees in 
loan contracts and have a reduced possible supply of lenders. Not surprisingly, they find that the 
negative impact on the loan spread is higher if a restatement is due to fraudulent activity. Park 
and Wu (2009) find significant negative abnormal loan returns and increased bid-ask spreads 
around restatements and that the secondary loan market exhibits superior informational 
efficiency compared to the stock market in reflecting the restatement information.  
 Because financial restatements are a type of accounting information disclosure, some scholars 
examine the behavior of the bid-ask spreads around a financial restatement. Unlike Palmrose et 
al. (2004) who find no significant change in bid-ask spreads around financial 
restatements, Anderson and Yohn (2002) find a significant increase in spreads for revenue-
recognition restatements.   
2.3.2 Consequences of financial restatements: Canadian evidence 
 Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013a) document that the expected future cash flows and their 
uncertainty are diminished and increased respectively due to financial restatements by Canadian 
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companies during the period of 1997 to 2006. They find that restatements associated with 
revenue recognition and company-initiated restatements generate larger price impacts, which are 
more severe if the firms also are cross-listed in the U.S. Announcements of revenue recognition 
restatements increase total residual volatility, its information-based permanent component and its 
adverse selection spread component. Relative spreads are also enhanced by financial 
restatements but they are comparatively lower for the firms cross-listed in the U.S.  
 Kryzanowski and Zhang (2013b) also report that the turnover of the CEO, President, CFO and 
external auditor is higher compared to their control firms in the two years following a 
restatement.  
 
3. SAMPLE AND DATA MANIPULATION 
 The sample selection begins by identifying all the financial restatements for Canadian firms 
that are announced between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2013 by searching on FACTIVA 
using the key words “restate”, “restating”, “restates”, “restated” and “restatement”. If the news 
report stated that the firm intended to restate, would restate or some other similar expression, the 
restatement event is captured for this firm. For announcements stating that the firms had restated, 
the first announcement date is used as the restatement announcement date. In the absence of an 
announcement on FACTIVA that the firm had restated, we checked SEDAR to ensure that all 
restatement information was captured.  
 This resulted in the identification of 394 events for 281 companies listed on the TSX and 
TSX-V. Market data was collected for the year (approximately 250 working days) before and 
after each restatement announcement. The daily stock returns, bid-ask spreads, trading volumes, 
trading values and closing prices of companies listed on the TSX were collected primarily from 
the Canadian Financial Markets Research Centre (CFMRC) database and those for companies 
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listed on the TSX-V were obtained from the TMX group.1 From this initial sample, 90 events are 
eliminated as they did not have trading data since the restating firms were temporarily halted, 
suspended or delisted prior to the restatement events and 23 events had no trading information, 
or even bid-ask spread information for the five working days surrounding each event. The two 
restatement events that were followed by M&As involving the restating firms by three months 
after the restatement announcements were retained in the sample. Table 1 provides the details of 
the elimination process from the initial sample to the final sample.  
 The final sample consists of 212 companies and 281 restatement events of which 114 are for 
TSX-listed companies, 161 are for TSX-V-listed companies, and 6 are for companies that moved 
from the TSX to the TSX-V during the studied period around each restatement. The final sample 
consists of 57 multi-announcement financial restatement events (i.e., possible or actual 
restatement intentions followed by actual restatements) and 167 single-announcement financial 
restatement events (14 restatement intentions with no subsequent actual restatements and 153 
actual restatements with no previous announcements that they intended to restate or were 
contemplating such). 
 All the restatement actions are classified into four categories. Type one actions are those 
associated with an announcement that includes words indicating a mistake or misstatement such 
as "correct", "error", "irregularity", "wrong", and "mistake". Type two actions consist of 
restatements to accommodate a change in a firm’s accounting policy or different way of 
calculating an accounting item with no word indicating that they are of type one. Type three 
actions are those associated with discontinued operations, reclassifying of assets after an M&A, 
selling properties or some reason other than those included in action types one and two. Type 
                                                          
1 Bloomberg was used as a secondary source of market data for companies with insufficient trading data from these 
two primary sources. 
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four actions are those in response to a review of a regulatory agency such as the BCSC. All the 
restatements also are divided into two samples based on whether the news or official 
announcements mentioned that the restatements would have no impact on the restating firm's 
cash flows, net cash balances or financial position or expressed similar wordings to that effect.  
 Based on Panel A of Table 2, most of the single-announcement financial restatement events 
are actual restatements since only 14 restatement “intentions” are not followed by actual 
restatements. There are an equal number of actual type one and two restatements with an almost 
equal number with and without some commentary about the impact on the financial positions of 
the restating firms. Based on Panel B of Table 2, more than half (57.9%) of the multi-
announcement financial restatements are of type 1 and almost one-third (29.8%) are of type 2. It 
is noteworthy that in the final sample, only 9 companies are not cross-listed in the U.S.  
 
4. HYPOTHESES 
      All of the financial restatements in our final sample are due to accounting fraud or errors and 
changes in accounting policy. Turner et al. (2001) find that negative price impacts are associated 
with “error related” financial restatements (type1 herein) and that no significant price effects are 
associated with changes in accounting policy or using different ways to calculate financial 
statement items (type2 herein). However, we expect the price effects associated with type1 
financial restatement announcements to be lessened, on average, if the restatement 
announcements contain wording such as “this restatement will have no impact on cash flows, net 
cash balances or financial positions”. Our first and second hypotheses are: 
𝐻0
1: Significant price effects are not associated with financial restatements that are “error 
related” (type1) or involve changes in accounting presentation (type2).  
𝐻𝑎
2: The price effects associated with type1 and type2 financial restatement announcements 
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will be greater if the restatement announcements contain wording such as “this 
restatement will have no impact on cash flows, net cash balances or financial positions”.   
 Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) argue that the bid-ask spread addresses the adverse selection 
problem which arises from transactions in company shares in the presence of asymmetrically 
informed investors. Trading volume is a measure of liquidity in that it captures the willingness of 
some investors to trade. This willingness to transact in firm shares should be inversely related to 
the existence of information asymmetries. Anderson and Yohn (2002) and Palmrose et al. 
(2004) test for changes in spreads around restatement announcements. Unlike Palmrose et al. 
(2004), Anderson and Yohn (2002) find a significant increase in spreads around revenue 
recognition restatements. Since we expect bid-ask spreads, trading volumes and trading values to 
increase following type1 single-announcement restatements, our third hypothesis in its 
alternative form is: 
𝐻𝑎
3: The relative quoted bid-ask spreads, trading volumes and trading values increase after 
type1 single-announcement restatement announcements.  
 Xu and Malkiel (2003) report that idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to expected 
earnings growth. Guo and Savickas (2006) find that idiosyncratic volatility is negatively related 
to future stock market returns. Jiang et al. (2009) find that stock return differences across 
idiosyncratic volatility deciles are largely driven by news about the future earnings of firms. 
Because financial restatement announcements send a market signal that the firm-specific 
information associated with pre-restatement prices was of lower quality, they are likely to have 
an impact on idiosyncratic volatility. Thus, our fourth hypothesis in its alternative form is: 
𝐻𝑎
4 : Idiosyncratic volatility increases following type1 single-announcement restatement 
announcements. 
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 The restating firms in our sample either first announced a financial restatement when it 
occurred or used a series of announcements that culminated with the announcement of the full 
details of the financial restatement. As noted earlier, we refer to the former and the latter as 
single- and multiple-announcement restatements, respectively. An example of a multiple-
announcement restatement is an initial public announcement that the firm is investigating 
whether it may need to financially restate, followed latter by an announcement that the firm 
intends to restate with some preliminary information containing some reasons and financial 
statement impacts of such, and culminating at a subsequent point in time with the restated 
financial statements and/or related documents.  Although single- and multiple-announcement 
restatements differ in terms of their associated market anticipation, we expect that the major 
market effects will be associated with the first announcement by the restating firms that it intends 
to restate, particularly if it provides some initial estimates of restatement effects. Thus, the fifth 
hypothesis in its alternative form is: 
𝐻𝑎
5: The major market impact occurs when a firm announces its intention to restate for a 
multiple-announcement restatement or announces that it has restated for a single-
announcement restatement. 
 Single- and multiple-announcement restatements differ in terms of their impacts on the rate of 
uncertainty resolution. Thus, the price effects associated with firm announcements that the firm 
intends to restate and did restate for multiple-announcement restatements may be higher than that 
for firm announcements that they have restated for single-announcement restatements. Therefore, 
we provide a first test of whether the choice of when and what a firm discloses has an effect on 
the price effects associated with financial restatements. Thus, the sixth hypothesis in its 
alternative form is: 
 - 13 - 
 
𝐻𝑎
6: The price effects associated with multiple-announcement restatements are higher than 
those associated with single-announcement restatements.  
 Furthermore, Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) conjecture that an increase in bid–ask spreads 
at the time of the restatement announcement is indicative of an increase in uncertainty. Conroy et 
al. (1990) use a trading-volume measure of liquidity which is primarily motivated by empirical 
findings of a negative relationship between volumes and bid-ask spreads. Therefore, we also 
expect bid-ask spreads to be higher and trading volumes, trading values and idiosyncratic 
volatilities to be lower in the period between the intention announcement and the final 
restatement announcement for multiple-announcement restatements. Thus, our seventh 
hypothesis in its alternative form is: 
𝐻𝑎
7 : Bid-ask spreads are higher and trading volumes, trading values and idiosyncratic 
volatilities are lower in the in-between period and revert back to pre-first-announcement 
levels after the final restatement announcement.  
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
5.1  Determination of the Event Window 
 Previous studies, such as Palmrose et al. (2004), adopt both a two-day (the day of and the day 
after) event window and a three-day event window [-1, +1] centered on each restatement-related 
announcement to capture any news leakage or delayed market response to the information 
contained in the announcement.  In this study, we also use the three-day event window. The 
event day [0] is set based on the earlier of the press release time and the official restatement 
filling time. If this time is after 4:00pm (i.e., the close of trading on the TSX and TSX-V), then 
the event day [0] is set as the next trading day. We have an in-between period for the multiple-
announcement restatements which starts on the second day [+2] after the day of the intention 
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announcement and ends on the second day [-2] before the official restatement announcement 
day.  
5.2  Regression Model for Estimating the Average Daily Abnormal Return        
 To test the market effects of different types of restatements, we first conduct an event study to 
obtain the abnormal returns (ARs) associated with each restatement. We use the following 
multiple-beta market model to quantify the stock price reactions to each restatement 
announcement: 
 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖1𝑅𝑚𝑡+𝛽𝑖2𝑅𝑚𝑡𝐷1 + 𝛽𝑖3𝑅𝑚𝑡𝐷2 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑅𝑚𝑡𝐷3 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝐷4
1
𝑗=−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑘𝐷5
1
𝑘=−1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑙𝐷6
1
𝑙=−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the excess return on restatement i for trading day t (i.e., the return for stock i minus 
the daily Canadian one-month T-bill rate); 𝛼𝑖is the intercept for restatement i; 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the excess 
return for the market, as proxied by the excess return on the S&P/TSX Composite Index for TSX 
listed firms or the TSX Venture Composite Index for TSX-V listed firms; 𝐷1 to 𝐷3 are dummy 
variables each equal to one on and after and until the next restatement announcement for each 
announcement associated with restatement i and zero otherwise to account for the possibility that 
the beta of the firm might change due to each restatement announcement associated with 
restatement i; 𝐷4  to 𝐷6  are the dummy variables each equal to one for the restatement 
announcements associated with restatement i for day j or k or l in the event window that covers 
the three days centered on the specific restatement announcement for restatement i and zeros 
otherwise; 𝛾𝑖. are the daily abnormal returns (ARs) during the three-day event window [-1, 1] 
centered on each restatement announcement associated with restatement i; and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error 
term that is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean, constant variance and zero 
correlation between error terms across and over time. 
 - 15 - 
 
 The ARs are estimated using up to 365 trading days with a minimum of approximately 180 
trading days before the first announcement associated with restatement i and up to 365 trading 
days with a minimum of approximately 90 trading days after the last restatement announcement 
associated with restatement i. The daily ARs are averaged across all the stocks in various 
samples for a specific type of restatement announcement to obtain their daily average abnormal 
returns (AARs). The associated cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are the sum of 
the AARs over a given multi-day time period. These cross-sectional mean and median AARs and 
CAARs are tested using a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed ranked test, respectively. 
5.3  Determination of Other Market Effects  
 We examine changes in other market effects (betas, quoted and relative spreads, trading 
volumes and values, and idiosyncratic risks) for four windows around the announcement day for 
single-announcement restatements, which are [-90, -2], [-30, -2], [+2, +30] and [+2, +90], 
respectively. We examine changes in these other market effects for five windows for multiple-
announcement restatements, which are [-90, -2] and [-30, -2] relative to the intention 
announcement day, the in-between period, and [+2, +30] and [+2, +90] relative to the official 
restatement announcement day. For each of these periods, we get the mean value of the quoted 
spread given by (Ask – Bid), the relative quoted spread given by (Ask – Bid)/ [(Ask + Bid)/2], 
the trading volume in number of shares, trading value in Canadian dollars for each firm, and  the 
standard deviation of the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 based on our estimated market model. To assess changes 
in the behavior of these other market effects around the announcement days for the various types 
of single-announcement restatements, we conduct cross-sectional tests for the vectors of 
differences of [+2, +30] - [-30, -2] and [+2, +90] – [-90, -2]. For the multiple-announcement 
restatements, we conduct similar tests using the vectors of differences of [-90, -2], [-30, -2] 
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relative to the intention announcements, the in-between period and [+2, +30], [+2, +90] relative 
to the final restatement announcements.  
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Single-announcement Restatements 
 In this section, we examine nine samples containing Type1 and/or Type2 single-
announcement restatements or subsets thereof. The samples are Type1&2, Type1 (all, TSX only, 
TSX-V only, and all with and without impacts) and Type2 (all, and all with and without 
impacts), respectively. “Impacts” refer to restatements with or without wording such as “this 
restatement will have no impact on cash flows, net cash balances or financial positions”.  
 The test results for each sample are reported in tables 4 and 5. In Panel A of Table 4, the mean 
and median CAAR of -2.88% and -1.28% for the Type1&2 restatements for the three-day event 
window [-1, 1] are statistically significant (p-values of 0.0016 and 0.0066, respectively). When 
we examine the CAARs for the Type1 and Type2 restatements separately, we find Type1 
restatements have significant three-day mean and median CAARs of -3.76 percent (p-value = 
0.010) and -2.68 percent (p-value = 0.0192), respectively. This is consistent with our first 
alternative hypothesis that error-related single-announcement restatements have significantly 
negative price impacts. As reported in panel B of table 4 for the type 1 single-announcement 
restatements, we observe significant mean and median price reactions of -2.67 percent and -0.58 
percent  for the event window [0, +1], which is consistent with the finding of Palmrose et al. 
(2004) for the U.S. that the major market effects occur in the [0, +1] event window. We find that 
the CAARs for Type1 restatements for the [-4, -2] and [+2, +4] windows are insignificant. This 
implies that there is no material information leakage or slowness in incorporating the information 
contained in the financial restatements. 
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 The abnormal returns for the Type1 single-announcement restatements by listing venue are 
reported in Table 5. We observe significant mean and median CAARs for event window [-1, 1] 
of -5.89 percent (p-value = 0.0016) and -5.13 percent (p-value = 0.0002), respectively, only for 
type1 restating firms listed on the TSX-V.  
 Table 5 also reports the abnormal returns for the type1 single-announcement restatements by 
whether or not they include wording such as “this restatement will have no impact on cash flows, 
net cash balances or financial positions”.  We observe that the mean and median CAAR for the 
event window [-1, 1] are only significant when such wording is not included for both the type1 
and type2 single-announcement financial restatements, and are greater in magnitude and 
significance for the type1 than type 2 single-announcement financial restatements. Specifically, 
the mean and median CAAR [-1, 1] are respectively insignificant values of -1.32% (p-value = 
0.1652) and -2.08% (p-value = 0.1633) for the type1 single-announcement financial restatements 
with such wording. In contrast, the mean and median are respectively significant values of -
6.46% (p-value = 0.0081) and -6.34% (p-value = 0.012) for the type1 single-announcement 
financial restatements without such wording. These results are consistent with our second 
hypothesis and also consistent with the finding of Palmrose et al. (2004) that firms restating 
more material misstatements incur more severe market reactions. 
 Since financial restatement announcements could affect a firm’s systematic risk, we examine 
the changes in the market betas associated with the different types of restatements. As reported in 
Table 6, both the mean and median post-announcement changes in the market betas are a 
significant -0.3916 (p-value = 0.0309) and -0.2525 (p-value = 0.0149), respectively, for type2 
restatement announcements. Furthermore, both the mean and median changes in the market betas 
for type2 restatement announcements that include a “no impact” disclosure are significant values 
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of -0.5391 (p-value = 0.0025) and -0.2914 (p-value = 0.0004), respectively.  None of the average 
post-announcement changes in the market betas are significant for the type1 restatement 
announcements. 
   Table 7 reports the mean and median differences between post- and pre-announcement 
windows for the single-announcement restatements of Type1 and Type2 separately and 
combined for idiosyncratic volatility, quoted spreads, relative quoted spreads, traded share 
volumes and traded share values. The traded volumes are in thousands of shares and the traded 
values are in thousands of CDN dollars. The window comparisons are [+2, +90] with [-2, -90] in 
Panel A and [+2, +30] with [-2, -30] in Panel B.  
 We observe only one significant change in the idiosyncratic volatilities, as measured by the 
standard deviations of the market model error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑡. This is for the median change of 0.0026 
(p-value = 0.0849) for Type1 financial restatements for the longer pre- and post-announcement 
comparison windows. Significant changes in quoted spreads confined to the longer comparison 
windows are associated with the Type1&2 and Type2 samples. For the Type1&2 sample, the 
mean and median changes in the quoted spreads are -0.0076 (p-value = 0.0260) and -0.0015 (p-
value = 0.0345), respectively. For the Type2 sample, the mean and median changes in the quoted 
spreads are -0.0085 (p-value = 0.0364) and -0.0019 (p-value = 0.0104), respectively. In contrast, 
the significant changes in quoted spreads confined to the shorter comparison windows are 
associated with the Type1&2 and Type1 samples. For the Type1&2 sample, the mean and 
median changes in the quoted spreads are -0.0066 (p-value = 0.0064) and -0.0009 (p-value = 
0.0427), respectively. For the Type2 sample, the mean and median changes in the quoted spreads 
are -0.0090 (p-value = 0.0145) and -0.0012 (p-value = 0.0587), respectively. Significant changes 
in the relative quoted spreads are confined to the longer comparison windows and the Type1&2 
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sample. They are the mean and median changes in the relative quoted spreads of 0.0062 (p-value 
= 0.0913) and 0.0014 (p-value = 0.0616), respectively.  
 Significant changes in traded share volumes are confined to the Type1&2 sample for both 
comparison window lengths. Specifically, we observe significant mean changes of 21,090.31 in 
thousands of shares (p-value = 0.0873) and 23,291.56 in thousands of shares (p-value = 0.0656) 
for the longer and shorter comparison window lengths, respectively, for the Type1&2 sample. 
Only the mean change of 89,960.06 thousands of CDN dollars (p-value = 0.1027) for traded 
share value for the shorter comparison window length for the Type1 sample is (marginally) 
significant.  
Table 8 presents the results for these other market effects for Type1 single-announcement 
restatements by TSX and TSX-V listed firms separately. We observe a significant increase in the 
median idiosyncratic volatility of 0.0163 (p-value = 0.0096) from event-window [-90, -2] to [+2, 
+90] for the Type1 single-announcement restatements by TSX-V listed firms (see Panel A of 
Table 8). Similarly, there is a significant increase in the mean traded values of 266,359.20 
thousands of CDN dollars (p-value = 0.0620) from the period [-30, -2] to [+2, +30] for the Type1 
restatements by TSX listed firms. 
    Table 9 presents the other market effects for Type1 and Type2 financial restatements with and 
without impact disclosures for the shorter and longer windows of 29 and 89 days, respectively, 
before and after the event date. Significant changes in quoted spreads are found for the Type2 
financial restatements with no impact disclosures for the longer comparison windows. The mean 
and median changes in the quoted spreads are -0.0062 (p-value = 0.0348) and -0.0018 (p-value = 
0.0246), respectively. The relative quoted spreads associated with Type2 financial restatements 
with no impact disclosures increase significantly by a mean value of 0.0077 (p-value = 0.0671) 
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and median value of 0.0028 (p-value = 0.0820) based on the longer comparison windows. The 
trading volumes associated with Type1 financial restatements with impact disclosures increase 
significantly by a mean value of 94,89.73 thousand CDN dollars (p-value = 0.0461) and median 
value of 52,72.71 thousands CDN dollars (p-value = 0.0546) based on the shorter comparison 
windows. The relative quoted spreads associated with Type1 financial restatements with impact 
disclosures decrease by a mean value of -0.0140 (p-value = 0.1073) based on the shorter 
comparison windows. The trading volumes associated with Type2 financial restatements with no 
impact disclosures increase significantly by a median value of 10,494.47 thousand shares traded  
(p-value = 0.0883) based on the shorter comparison windows. 
 
6.2 Multiple-announcement Restatements  
    As in Scholz (2008), we initially treat each multiple-announcement restatement as one 
restatement by combining the effects from the various announcements. Based on Panel B of 
Table2, there are 33 Type1 multiple-announcement restatements in our sample. Based on the 
number of days in the in-between period, all the multiple-announcement restatements can be 
categorized into three categories: 1) those where the number of days in between is more than two 
days; 2) those where the number of days in between is one or two days; and 3) those where the 
number of days in between is zero, which means that the official announcements occur on the 
day following the intention announcement day. For those with a zero-day in-between, we define 
them as single-announcements and treat their two consecutive announcement-day CAAR as 
being a single day AR. We have 23 multiple-announcement restatements with in-between 
periods of more than two days. If we exclude the one with 78 in-between days and another with 
63 in-between days, the mean of number of days is 10.43.  
 For the multiple-announcement Type1 restatements, we examine the CAAR for the 
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restatement intention dates, in-between periods, the final restatement dates, and the period 
extending from the intention date through the in-between period. For those multiple-
announcement restatements that have only one day in between, because each event window is set 
as [-1, +1], we use AAR [-1] for the first announcement as the pre-announcement return and 
CAAR [-2, 0] for the second announcement as the intention announcement effect. 
    Based on Panel A of Table 10, we observe significant mean and median CAARs of -5.35 
percent (p-value = 0.0076) and -2.38 percent (p-value = 0.0088), respectively, for the three-day 
window [-1, +1] for intention announcements. We also observe significant median CAARs of -
3.42 percent for the in-between periods, and no significant CAAR for the final official 
restatement windows. These results are consistent with our fifth hypothesis. When we combine 
the CAAR from the intention announcement window with that for the in-between period, we 
obtain a significant mean CAAR of 16.16 percent (p-value of 0.0940) and median CAAR of -
8.82 percent (p-value of 0.0032).  
    We now examine the ARs for each day with the three-day window for intention 
announcements. Based on Panel B of Table 10, only the median market impact of -2.4 percent 
for day [0] is significant (p-value of 0.0258). This findings is consistent with our fifth hypothesis 
which is the major market impact occurs when a firm announces its intention to restate for a 
multiple-announcement restatement or announces that it has restated for a single-announcement 
restatement. Based on Panel C of Table 10, we find that all ∆Beta are not significant.  
 Due to the large CAAR for the in-between period for the multiple-announcement type1 
financial restatements, we find that their CAAR effects (mean and median values of -16.16 
percent and -8.82 percent, respectively) are substantially greater than those for their single-
announcement counterparts (mean and median of -3.76 percent and -2.68 percent, respectively). 
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This finding is consistent with our sixth hypothesis, which is that the price effects associated 
with multiple-announcement restatements are higher than those associated with single-
announcement restatements. 
    We report test of the other market effects for Type2 multiple-announcement restatements in 
Table 11. In Panel A of Table 11, we compare their values in the period [-90, -2] prior to the 
intention announcement with the period [+2, +90] after the final restatement announcement. We 
find that relative quoted spreads increase by a significant mean value of 0.0260 (p-value = 
0.1016), and the idiosyncratic volatility increases significantly by a mean value of 0.0185 (p-
value = 0.0237) and a median value of 0.0067 (p-value = 0.0727). When we narrow the 
comparison periods to [-30, -2] prior to the intention announcement and [+2, +30] after the final 
restatement, we find that the relative quoted spreads increase by a significant mean value of 
0.0220 (p-value = 0.0718) but that the mean and median changes in idiosyncratic volatility are 
insignificant.  
 In Panel C the cross-sectional mean trading volume significantly drops with the median value 
of -6220.02 thousand shares traded (p-value = 0.0484) from period [-90, -2] of the intention 
announcement to the in-between period. The idiosyncratic volatility also decrease significantly 
by mean value of -0.0135 (p-value= 0.0957) and median value of -0.0143 (p-value= 0.0874). 
 Panel D clearly shows that the relative quoted spread cross-sectional mean changes 
significantly from [-30, -2] prior to the intention announcement day to the in-between period.  
The mean and median changes are 0.0231 (p-value = 0.0138) and 0.0122 (p-value = 0.0103), 
respectively. The median change of trading value from [-30, -2] prior to the intention 
announcement to the in-between period has a significant value of -1209.40 thousand CDN 
dollars (p-value = 0.0232). 
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 In Panel E, we observe significant increases in idiosyncratic volatilities from the in-between 
period to the [+2, +90] period after the final official restatement.  The mean change is 0.0272 (p-
value = 0.0282) and the median change is 0.0149 (p-value = 0.0160). The trading volumes 
significantly increase after the final restatement announcements based on a comparison of the 
period [+2, +90] with the in-between period. The mean increase is 19,360.64 thousands of shares 
traded (p-value = 0.0404) and the median increase is 4,922.10 thousands of shares traded (p-
value = 0.0296).  
 Based on Panel F, we observe significant changes in the shares traded from the in-between 
period to the period [+2, +30] after the final restatement announcement. Their mean value of 
12,949.76 thousand shares (p-value = 0.0527) and median value of 2,878.72 thousand shares (p-
value = 0.0637) are smaller than their corresponding values for the longer window. Trading 
values increase significantly from the in-between period to the [+2, +30] period after the official 
restatement announcements. The mean and median increases are 9,886.20 thousand CDN dollars 
(p-value = 0.0641) and 1,159.01 thousand CDN dollars (p-value = 0.0117), respectively. These 
findings support our seventh hypothesis of higher bid-ask spreads and lower trading volumes, 
trading values and idiosyncratic volatilities in the in-between period that revert back to their pre-
first-announcement levels after the final restatement announcement.  
 
7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 As a test of robustness, the daily abnormal returns are estimated using returns based on the 
daily mid-spreads instead of the daily closing prices. We find somewhat similar results when we 
compare the new quoted-based CAAR results for various event windows for the Type1 and 
Type2 single-announcement restatements separately and together reported in Table 12 with their 
trade-based counterparts reported earlier in Table 4. Consistent with our previously reported 
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results for the [-1, +1] window, we obtain statistically significant mean and median CAAR of -
2.69% (p-value = 0.0101) and -2.04% (p-value <.0001), respectively, for the Type1&2 
undifferentiated sample, and statistically significant mean and median CAAR of -3.42% (p-value 
= 0.0438) and -2.70% (p-value = 0.0070), respectively, for the Type1 single-announcement 
restatements. For this three-day event window, the major impact still occurs on day [0]. 
Specifically, the mean and median AR for day [0] for the Type1 single-announcement 
restatements are -1.83% (p-value = 0.0952) and -0.91% (p-value = 0.0095), respectively. While 
the median CAAR for the two-day event window [0, +1] remains significant (p-value = 0.0491), 
the mean CAAR is no longer significant. 
 We find somewhat weaker results for the CAAR for the event window [0, +1] when we 
compare the new quoted-based results reported in Table 13 with the trade-based results reported 
earlier in Table 5 for the Type1 single-announcement restatements differentiated by disclosed 
impacts. The mean and the median CAAR for the event window [0, +1] remain negative and 
highly significant for the type1 restatements of TSX-V-listed firms. Both the mean and median 
CAAR for the event window [0, +1] for the Type1 and Type2 restatements with disclosed 
impacts remain negative but generally with poorer levels of significance. While the median 
CAAR remains significant at the 0.05 level for the Type1 restatements with disclosed impacts, 
its highly significant mean counterpart becomes insignificant at conventional levels. Both the 
mean and median CAAR for the event window [0, +1] for the Type2 restatements with disclosed 
impacts are no longer significant at conventional levels. 
 We find similar results when we compare the new quoted-based results for beta changes 
reported in Table 14 with the trade-based results reported earlier in Table 6 for the Type1 and 
Type2 single-announcement restatements. The exceptions include the median beta change for the 
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Type1&2 restatements that is no longer significant and the mean beta change for the Type2 
restatements which moves from being significant at the 0.05 to the 0.10 level. 
 We find some changes in the results for multiple-announcement restatements based on a 
comparison of Table 15 with Table 10. For example, based on a comparison of the Panel As in 
both tables, we find that the highly significant negative mean and median CAAR for the [-1, +1] 
window for intention announcements remain significant but are now only weakly significant. In 
contrast, the insignificantly negative mean CAAR for the [0, +1] window for intention 
announcements is now significant and the weakly significant median counterpart remains 
negative but becomes highly significant.  When we compare the Panel Bs in both tables for each 
day in the [-1, +1] window for intention announcements, we find that only the median AR of -
0.0141 for day [0] is significant in each panel (p-value = 0.0240 in Table 10 and 0.0881 in Table 
15).  When we compare the beta-change values in Panel C in both tables, we find that all the 
change estimates remain insignificant at conventional levels. 
       
8. CONCLUSION 
 By analyzing Canadian restatement data, we find that error-related single-announcement 
financial restatements are associated with significant negative market impacts in a two day event 
window [0, +1]. This result is consistent with previous research that finds that restatement 
announcements are associated with negative market impacts depending on their type (e.g., 
Dechow et al., 1996; Turner et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2002; Wu, 2002; Palmrose et al., 
2004).  
 We also find that bid-ask spreads, trading volumes and trading values do not change 
significantly for error-related, single-announcement financial restatements in the post-
announcement period. In contrast, the median idiosyncratic volatility associated with error-
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related, single-announcement restatements increases significantly following the announcements.  
 For multiple-announcement restatements, we observe significant market impacts at the 
intention announcement day and additional market impacts occur prior to but not on the official 
restatements. In the in-between period after the intention to restate is announced, bid-ask spreads 
increase and trading volumes, trading values and the idiosyncratic volatilities decrease 
significantly. After the official restatement is announced, trading volumes, trading values and 
idiosyncratic volatilities increase significantly.  
 We observe higher total market impacts for multiple versus single announcement financial 
restatements most likely due to the greater uncertainty and the negative signal sent to investors 
about the state of financial control and management associated with the former types of 
restatements. This is consistent with the findings of Schmidt and Wilkins (2012) that lower 
auditor quality and lower audit committee expertise are associated with poorer financial 
reporting timeliness as measured by the duration of the in-between period for financial statement 
restatements.  
 
9. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The research reported herein can be extended by examining various categories of accounting-
error (Type1) restatements. These include: (1) type(s) of error corrections (e.g., revenue 
recognition, expense recognition, misclassification, equity, tax accounting, and capital assets); 
(2) irregularity (e.g., intentional misstatements or omissions of amounts or disclosures in 
financial statements) (Hennes et al., 2008); and (3) originator of the restatement (e.g., firm, 
auditor or regulator). Follow-up studies also could examine changes in corporate governance 
(e.g., executive, auditor and board member changes) after single-announcement restatements and 
in-between and after multiple-announcement restatements.   
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TABLES AND FIGURES  
Table 1. Number of financial restatements eliminated from the initial sample 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the number of financial restatements eliminated from the initial sample 
for various reasons before arriving at the final sample by listing venue. The financial restatement events followed by 
M&As in the following three months for two TSX-V firms are retained in the final sample. 
 Number of events from companies listed on: 
TSX TSX-V TSX to TSX-V Total 
Initial sample 158 227 9 394 
No trading data because firm halted, 
suspended or delisted 
36 51 3 90 
No trading data for unknown reasons 8 15  23 
Total number of eliminated events 44 66 3 113 
Final sample  114 161 6 281 
 34 
 
Table2. The number of each type of financial restatement 
This table provides the number of financial restatements in the final sample of restatement events differentiated by 
type, whether they were single or multi-announcement restatements, whether they are restatement intentions or 
actual restatements and whether or not their disclosure includes a statement about their impact on the firm’s 
financial situation. The four types of restatement events are: Type1: an announcement that includes words indicating 
a mistake or mistatement such as "correct", "error", "irregularity", "wrong", and "mistake". Type2: restatements to 
accommodate a change in a firm’s accounting policy or different way of calculating an accounting item with no 
word indicating that they are of type1. Type3: restatements associated with discontinued operations, reclassifying of 
assets after an M&A, selling properties or some reason other than those included in action types1 and 2. Type4: 
restatements in response to a review of a regulatory agency such as the BCSC. 
Panel A: Single-announcement financial restatements  
Type 
Restatement Intentions Actual Restatements 
Total With Explanation No Explanation With Explanation No Explanation 
1 2 3 21 24 50 
2 1 4 25 20 50 
3 0 2 8 14 27 
4 0 2 12 29 40 
Total 3 11 66 87 167 
Panel B: Multiple-announcement financial restatements  
Type 
Restatement Intentions Actual Restatements 
Total With Explanation No Explanation With Explanation No Explanation 
1 15 18 14 19 66 
2 6 10 6 12 34 
3 1 2 1 2 6 
4 0 3 0 5 8 





Table 3. Samples of single-announcement restatements examined 
This table lists the samples of single-announcement restatements examined and the number of announcements so examined.   
 
Sample Description Sample sizes 
Type1&2 All the announcements for type1 and type2 single-announcement restatements 90 
Type1 All the announcements for type1 single-announcement restatements 45 
Type1-
NoImpacts 
All the announcements for type1 single-announcement restatements with announcement wordings such as 
“this restatement will have no impact on cash flows, net cash balances or financial positions” 
21 
Type1-Impacts 
All the announcements for type1 single-announcement restatements without wording such as “this 
restatement will have no impact on cash flows, net cash balances or financial positions”. 
24 





All the announcements for type2 single-announcement restatements with announcement wordings such as 
“this restatement will have no impact on cash flows, net cash balances or financial positions” 
25 
Type2-Impacts 
All the announcements for type2 single-announcement restatements without wording such as “this 
restatement will have no impact on cash flows, net cash balances or financial positions”. 
20 
 
Type1-TSX All the announcements for type1 single-announcement restatements in TSX  17 







Table 4. Abnormal return test results for single-announcement restatements of Type1 and/or Type2 
This table reports the mean and median CAAR for various event windows and the p-values based on t- and Wilcoxon tests of their statistical significance for  the 
Type1 and Type2 samples combined and separately. Type1: an announcement that includes words indicating a mistake or misstatement such as "correct", "error", 
"irregularity", "wrong", and "mistake". Type2: restatements to accommodate a change in a firm’s accounting policy or different way of calculating an accounting 
item with no word indicating that they are of type1.  *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1&2) 
size N=90, Sample (Type1) size N=45, Sample (Type2) size N=45.    
Statistic 
Type1&2 Type2 Type1 
[-1, +1] [-1, +1] [-1, +1] [-4, -2] [-1] [0] [+1] [0,+1] [+2, +4] 
Mean CAAR -0.0288*** -0.0286* -0.0376*** -0.0001 -0.0082 -0.0209*** -0.0072 -0.0267** -0.0018 
t-test p-value 0.0016 0.0602 0.0100 0.941 0.1675 0.0080 0.2789 0.0325 0.1792 
Median CAAR -0.0128*** -0.0112 -0.0268** -0.0006 -0.0024 -0.005688 -0.0052 -0.0132** 0.0002 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0066 0.1081 0.0192 0.9705 0.1612 0.0322 0.2122 0.0430 0.5095 
 
Table 5. CAAR test results for different single-announcement restatements of Type1 or Type2 differentiated by listing venue and impact disclosure 
This table reports the mean and median CAAR for the event window [0, +1] for type1 restatements differentiated by whether they are listed on the TSX or TSX-
V, and for Type1 and Type2 restatement differentiated by whether or not they include a disclosure on their cash or cash-flow-related impacts.  The p-values for t- 
and Wilcoxon tests of their means and medians, respectively, are also reported. Type1: an announcement that includes words indicating a mistake such as 
"correct", "error", "irregularity", "wrong", and "mistake". Type2: restatements to accommodate a change in a firm’s accounting policy or different way of 
calculating an accounting item with no word indicating that they are of type1.  *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. Sample (Type1 TSX-listed) size N=17, Sample (Type1 TSX-V-listed) size N=28, Sample (Type1 No impact disclossed) size N=21, Sample (Type1 
Impact disclosed) size N=24, Sample (Type2 No impact disclosed) size N=25, Sample (Type2 Impact disclosed) size N=20.     
Statistic 
Type1 Type2 
TSX-listed TSX-V-listed No impact disclosed Impact disclosed No impact disclosed Impact disclosed 
Mean CAAR -0.0045 -0.0589*** -0.0132 -0.0646*** -0.0169 -0.0496** 
t-test p-value 0.8068 0.0016 0.1652 0.0081 0.3408 0.0418 
Median CAAR -0.0003 -0.0513*** -0.0208 -0.0634** 0.0049 -0.0353** 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.9265 0.0002 0.1633 0.0120 0.6261 0.0441 
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Table 6. Results for tests of post-announcement changes in the market betas for different samples of single-announcement restatements  
This table reports the mean and median changes (∆Beta) for various samples of Type1 and Type2 financial restatements and tests of their significance using t- 
and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. Impact refers to at least one statement in the financial restatement disclosure that the restatement would impact the firm’s 
financial situation. Type1: restatements whose announcements include words indicating a mistake or misstatement such as "correct", "error", "irregularity", 
"wrong", and "mistake". Type2: restatements to accommodate changes in accounting policy or different ways of calculating accounting items with no words 
indicating that they are of type1.  *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1&2) size N=90, 
Sample (Type1) size N=45, Sample (Type2) size N=45, Sample (Type1 TSX-listed) size N=17, Sample (Type1 TSX-V-listed) size N=28, Sample (Type1 No 
impact disclossed) size N=21, Sample (Type1 Impact disclosed) size N=24, Sample (Type2 No impact disclosed) size N=25, Sample (Type2 Impact disclosed) 











disclosed All Impact disclosed 
No impact 
disclosed 
Mean ∆Beta -0.2891 -0.1931 -0.9917 0.4519 0.1648 -0.5666 -0.3916** -0.2146 -0.5391*** 
t-test p-value 0.2489 0.6737 0.2460 0.3321 0.7482 0.4701 0.0309 0.5316 0.0025 
Median ∆Beta -0.1735* 0.0936 -0.1236 0.0253 -0.2956 0.1526 -0.2525** -0.1723 -0.2914*** 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0709 0.8026 0.2688 0.4957 0.2266 0.1526 0.0149 0.6742 0.0004 
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Table 7. Summary of test results for post-announcement changes in other market metrics for single-
announcement restatements  
 
This table reports the results of tests of post-announcement changes in idiosyncratic volatilities, quoted spreads, 
relative quoted spreads, traded volumes and traded values for single-announcement restatement types1 and 2 
separately and combined. The paired window comparisons are [+2, +90] with [-2, -90], and [+2, +30] with [-2, -30]. 
The *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1&2) 
size N=90, Sample (Type1) size N=45, Sample (Type2) size N=45. The traded volumes are in thousands of shares 


















mean 0.0619 -0.0076** 0.0062* 21,090.31* 36,213.89 
t-test p-value 0.3378 0.0260 0.0913 0.0873 0.2884 
median  0.0015 -0.0015** 0.0014* 2,741.67 -88.25 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.3297 0.0345 0.0616 0.1941 0.7497 
1 
mean 0.1149 -0.0029 0.0082 40,540.38 49,899.75 
t-test p-value 0.3650 0.4761 0.1204 0.1681 0.3813 
median 0.0026* -0.0006 0.0011 1,491.38 -88.25 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0849 0.5122 0.1749 0.6011 0.9811 
2 
mean 0.0067 -0.0085** 0.0033 16,666.88 -8,420.99 
t-test p-value 0.5655 0.0364 0.4631 0.1283 0.3409 
median 0.0004 -0.0019*** 0.0019 6,534.02 -909.52 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.7465 0.0104 0.1788 0.1820 0.5424 
Panel B: Change from  [-2, -30] to [+2, +30] 
1&2 
mean -0.0050 -0.0066*** -0.0033 23,291.56* 31,420.18 
t-test p-value 0.3414 0.0064 0.1995 0.0656 0.1949 
median -0.0009 -0.0009** 0.0001 -80.31 209.28 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.4168 0.0427 0.8260 0.3396 0.6870 
1 
mean -0.0051 -0.0090** -0.0028 26,476.84 89,960.06* 
t-test p-value 0.5540 0.0145 0.4741 0.2212 0.1027 
median  -0.0007 -0.0012* <.0001 878.84 126.6 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.7863 0.0587 0.8774 0.4461 0.9433 
2 
mean -0.0049 -0.0027 -0.0027 20,153.28 853.26 
t-test p-value 0.4173 0.1863 0.3702 0.1794 0.9119 
median -0.0015 -0.0007 0.0014 -582.41 660.02 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.3614 0.2619 0.7263 0.5261 0.6012 
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Table 8. Summary of test results for post-announcement changes in other market metrics for single-announcement restatements differentiated by 
restatement type and listing venue 
This table reports the results of tests of post-announcement changes in idiosyncratic volatilities, quoted spreads, relative quoted spreads, traded volumes and 
traded values for single-announcement restatement types1 and 2 separately differentiated by listing venue. The paired window comparisons are [+2, +90] with [-
2, -90], and [+2, +30] with [-2, -30].  *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1) size N=45, 
Sample (Type1 TSX-listed) size N=17, Sample (Type1 TSX-V-listed) size N=28. The traded volumes are in thousands of shares and the traded values are in 
thousands of CDN dollars. 
 
Listing Market 
Statistic ∆Idiosyncratic volatility ∆Quoted spreads 
∆Relative quoted 
spreads ∆Trading volumes ∆Traded values 
 Panel A: Change from [-2, -90] to [+2, +90] 
TSX listing mean -0.0496 -0.0001 0.0006 71,710.36 234,039.30 
t-test p-value 0.3071 0.9623 0.6281 0.2695 0.2437 
median -0.0020 -0.0014 0.0007 -3,476.88 1,557.40 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.6799 0.6507 0.5412 0.7983 0.7086 
TSX-V listing mean 0.2550 -0.0100 0.0213 14,397.65 -175.64 
t-test p-value 0.2729 0.3337 0.0821 0.1547 0.9819 
median 0.0163*** <.0001 0.0025 2,905.43 -350.78 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0096 0.5953 0.1311 0.2068 0.4205 
 Panel B: Change from  [-2, -30] to [+2, +30] 
TSX listing mean -0.0049 -0.0040 -0.0002 53,018.84 266,359.20* 
t-test p-value 0.3350 0.2901 0.8683 0.2790 0.0620 
median -0.0065 0.0024 <.0001 3,189.53 4004.40 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.3732 0.8906 0.8596 0.7086 0.3124 
TSX-V listing mean -0.0053 -0.0132** -0.0023 4,864.40 -12,559.30 
t-test p-value 0.7357 0.0217 0.7748 0.4524 0.2432 
median 0.0019 -0.0045** <.0001 291.92 -353.20 




Table 9. Summary of test results for post-announcement changes in other market metrics for single-announcement restatements differentiated by 
restatement type and impact 
 
This table reports the results of tests of post-announcement changes in idiosyncratic volatilities, quoted spreads, relative quoted spreads, traded volumes and 
traded values for single-announcement restatement types1 and 2 separately differentiated by impact. The paired window comparisons are [+2, +90] with [-2, -
90], which are referred to as “long”, and [+2, +30] with [-2, -30], which are referred to as “short”.  *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1) size N=45, Sample (Type2) size N=45, Sample (Type1 No impact disclossed) size N=21, Sample (Type1 Impact 
disclosed) size N=24, Sample (Type2 No impact disclosed) size N=25, Sample (Type2 Impact disclosed) size N=20. The traded volumes are in thousands of 
shares and the traded values are in thousands of CDN dollars. 
Type Statistic 
∆Idiosyncratic 
volatility ∆Quoted spreads 
∆Relative quoted 
spreads ∆Trading volumes ∆Traded values 
Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short Long Short 
1, no 
impact 
mean -0.0302 0.0100 -0.0006 -0.0082* 0.0028 0.0030 30,722.77 23,236.61 -1,713.04 74,853.47 
t-test p-value 0.5069 0.1943 0.8778 0.0567 0.2321 0.2429 0.4966 0.4900 0.9868 0.5366 
median -0.0012 0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0010 0.0001 985.28 -974.61 83.09 -2,770.31 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.6854 0.4230 0.7181 0.2317 0.2870 0.9126 0.8631 0.7656 0.9875 0.8385 
1, 
impact 
mean 0.2600 -0.0202 -0.0021 -0.0079* 0.0075 -0.0140* 9,056.89 9,489.73** 7,108.11 5,009.46 
t-test p-value 0.3018 0.1881 0.6995 0.0626 0.3512 0.1073 0.4124 0.0461 0.2868 0.6542 
median 0.0128 -0.0039 -0.0006 -0.0016 0.0014 -0.0005 1,491.38 5,272.71* -323.19 719.50 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.1108 0.2728 0.5958 0.1134 0.3683 0.4900 0.5949 0.0546 0.8288 0.5678 
2, no 
impact 
mean 0.0134 -0.0057 -0.0062** -0.0057* 0.0077* -0.0044 14,221.32 21,463.43 -12,420.20 804.17 
t-test p-value 0.4697 0.4868 0.0348 0.0514 0.0671 0.1331 0.4014 0.2416 0.2974 0.9469 
median 0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0018** -0.0024** 0.0028* -0.0017 4,127.74 10,494.47* -855.80 3,969.64 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.7243 0.3782 0.0246 0.0425 0.0820 0.2725 0.5392 0.0883 0.5392 0.4780 
2, 
impact 
mean -0.0006 -0.0040 -0.0063 0.0011 -0.0053 0.0011 21,491.21* 3,857.96 -2,227.34 -892.41 
t-test p-value 0.9681 0.6621 0.1796 0.6614 0.5154 0.7788 0.1025 0.8153 0.7986 0.8981 
median -0.0013 0.0012 -0.0019* 0.0004 0.0008 0.0029 13,645.40 -5,812.62 -921.17 -1,580.19 





Table10. Results for type1 multiple-announcement restatements  
This table provides all the AARs’ and CAARs’ mean and median values with their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values 
for the various categories.   *means significant at 0.1; **means significant at 0.05 and ***means significant at 0.01; 
Sample size N=33 (33 intentions and 33 official restatements).  
Panel A: Mean and median CAAR for each event window and their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values for Type1 














restatement   
at [-1, +1]  
Intention 
effect period 
Mean CAAR -0.0214 -0.0535*** -0.0239 -0.1140 0.1341 -0.1616* 
t-test p-value 0.2857 0.0076 0.3551 0.2753 0.2334 0.0940 




0.0088 0.0881 0.1056 0.4354 0.0032 
 Panel B: Mean and median AR and their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values for each day in the event window for 
Type1 intention announcements.  
 
Intention announcement at  
      [-1] 
Intention announcement at        
[0] 
Intention announcement at 
[+1] 
Mean AR -0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0208 
t-test p-value 0.2078 0.9334 0.3127 
Median AR 0.0036 -0.0240** -0.0108 
Wilcoxon test 
p-value 0.5368 0.0258 0.3340 
 Panel C: Mean and median ∆Beta’ and their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values for each category.    
 
Caused by intention 
announcements Caused by final restatements 
Caused by entire multiple-
announcement restatements 
Mean ∆Beta 0.6264 -0.7935 -0.0733 
t-test p-value 0.5472 0.5063 0.6624 
Median ∆Beta -0.2776 0.0672 -0.2446 
Wilcoxon test 




Table11. Cross-sectional test results for the vectors of differences of trading volumes, quoted spreads, relative 
quoted spreads and traded values of multiple-announcement restatements 
This table reports the results of the cross-sectional tests of the vectors of differences in the idiosyncratic volatilities, quoted 
spreads, relative quoted spreads, traded volumes and traded values for comparisons of post-official announcement windows, in-
between windows and pre-intention announcement windows, respectively for type1 multiple-announcement restatements. *, ** 
and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. The traded volumes are in thousands of 







∆Trading   
volumes 
∆Traded values 
Panel A: Values for [+2,+90] after the official restatement minus [-90,-2] before the intention announcement 
mean 0.0185** -0.0041 0.0260* -755.089 4,247.72 
t-test p-value 0.0237 0.7432 0.1016 0.8681 0.3494 
median 0.0067* 0.0004 0.0011 2,936.01 1,758.86 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0727 0.6261 0.498 0.6502 0.1995 
Panel B: Values for [+2,+30] after the official restatement minus [-30,-2] before the intention announcement 
mean 0.0220 0.0194 0.0220* 5,304.93 -1,422.93 
t-test p-value 0.1306 0.2067 0.0718 0.4383 0.8707 
median -0.0005 0.0008 0.0076 4,299.33 443.96 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.2387 0.2256 0.1756 0.2842 0.6261 
Panel C: Values for in-between period minus [-90,-2] before the intention announcement 
mean -0.0135* -0.0166* 0.0080 -9,109.07 -8,394.03 
t-test p-value 0.0957 0.0523 0.1994 0.1106 0.2770 
median -0.0143* 0.0001 0.0099 -6,220.02** -2,271.71 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0874 0.2538 0.1157 0.0484 0.1756 
Panel D: Values for the in-between period minus [-30,-2] before the intention announcement 
mean -0.0027 0.0051 0.0231** -7,271.91 -14,649.80 
t-test p-value 0.6102 0.2741 0.0138 0.1219 0.1164 
median 0.0020 0.0021 0.0123*** -1,622.24 -1,209.40** 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.6226 0.1536 0.0103 0.1769 0.0232 
Panel E: Values for  [+2,+90] after the official restatement minus in-between period 
mean 0.0272** 0.0150 0.0162 19,360.64** 3,421.89 
t-test p-value 0.0282 0.1845 0.1870 0.0404 0.4500 
median 0.0149** 0.0020 -0.0006 4,922.10** 2,882.17 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.0160 0.1995 0.6477 0.0296 0.2842 
Panel F: Values for [+2,+30] after the official restatement minus in-between period 
mean 0.0118 0.0059 0.0044 12,949.76* 9,886.20* 
t-test p-value 0.1959 0.3238 0.5655 0.0527 0.0641 
median -0.0018 0.0013 -0.0010 2,878.72* 1,159.01** 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.4180 0.3885 0.8538 0.0637 0.0117 
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Table12. Robustness test results for abnormal returns for single-announcement restatements using mid-spread returns 
This table reports the mean and median CAAR for various event windows and the p-values based on t- and Wilcoxon tests of the Type1 and Type2 samples combined and 
separately when returns are calculated using mid-spreads. Type1: an announcement that includes words indicating a mistake such as "correct", "error", "irregularity", "wrong", and 
"mistake". Type2: restatements to accommodate a change in a firm’s accounting policy or different way of calculating an accounting item with no word indicating that they are of 
type1.  *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1&2) size N=90, Sample (Type1) size N=45, Sample (Type2) size 
N=45.    
   
 
Type1&2 Type2 Type1 




[-1] [0] [+1] [0,+1] [+2, +4] 
Mean CAAR -0.0269*** -0.0192 -0.0342** -0.0076 -0.0074 -0.0183* -0.0085 -0.0267 -0.0190 
t-test p-value 0.0101 0.1133 0.0438 0.5724 0.3862 0.0952 0.3645 0.1213 0.2261 
Median CAAR -0.0204*** -0.0051 -0.0270*** -0.0072 -0.0061 -0.0091*** -0.0042 -0.0180** -0.0012 
Wilcoxon test p-value <.0001 0.1190 0.0070 0.4333 0.3573 0.0095 0.2852 0.0491 0.3573 
 
Table 13. Robustness test results for CAAR for different single-announcement restatements using mid-spread returns 
This table reports the mean and median CAAR for the two day event window [0, +1] for type1 restatements on the TSX and TSX-V, and for type1 and type2 restatement 
differentiated by whether or not they include a disclosure on their cash or cash-flow-related impact when returns are calculated using mid-spreads.  The p-values for t- and 
Wilcoxon tests of their means and medians are also reported. Type1: an announcement that includes words indicating a mistake such as "correct", "error", "irregularity", "wrong", 
and "mistake". Type2: restatements to accommodate a change in a firm’s accounting policy or different way of calculating an accounting item with no word indicating that they are 
of type1.  *, ** and *** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1 TSX-listed) size N=17, Sample (Type1 TSX-V-listed) size 
N=28, Sample (Type1 No impact disclossed) size N=21, Sample (Type1 Impact disclosed) size N=24, Sample (Type2 No impact disclosed) size N=25, Sample (Type2 Impact 
disclosed) size N=20.      
 Type1 Type2 
TSX-listed TSX-V-listed No impact 
disclosed 
Impact disclosed No impact disclosed Impact disclosed 
Mean CAAR -0.0011 -0.0608*** -0.0273 -0.0408 -0.0132 -0.0263 
t-test  p-value 0.9685 0.0021 0.1798 0.1382 0.4284 0.1491 
Median CAAR -0.0025 -0.0324*** -0.0220 -0.0389** 0.0040 -0.0327 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.7756 <.0001 0.2317 0.0171 0.6373 0.1054 
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Table14. Robustness test results for ∆Beta for different single-announcement restatements using mid-spread returns 
This table provides the results of the robustness tests for  the mean and median ∆Beta and their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values for the various categories. The 
impact disclosed or not means whether or not their disclosure includes a statement about their impact on the firm’s financial situation. Type1means an 
announcement that includes words indicating a mistake such as "correct", "error", "irregularity", "wrong", and "mistake". Type2 means restatements to 
accommodate a change in a firm’s accounting policy or different way of calculating an accounting item with no word indicating that they are of type1.  *, ** and 
*** refer to statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Sample (Type1&2) size N=90, Sample (Type1) size N=45, Sample (Type2) size 
N=45, Sample (Type1 TSX-listed) size N=17, Sample (Type1 TSX-V-listed) size N=28, Sample (Type1 No impact disclossed) size N=21, Sample (Type1 

















Mean ∆Beta -0.1800 -00863 -1.0600 0.7002 0.4544 -0.6504 -0.2802* -0.1436 -0.3940*** 
t-test p-value 0.4962 0.8611 0.1947 0.2415 0.4837 0.3916 0.0867 0.6608 0.0037 
Median ∆Beta -0.1232 0.0595 -0.1232 0.1223 -0.1251 0.1166 -0.2768** 0.0853 -0.3029*** 




Table15. Robustness test results for type1 multiple-announcement restatements using mid-spread returns 
This table provides robustness test results for the mean and median AAR and CAAR with their t test and Wilcoxon 
test p-values for the various categories.   *means significant at 0.1; **means significant at 0.05 and ***means 
significant at 0.01; Sample size N=33 (33 intentions and 33 official restatements).  
   
Panel A: Mean and median CAAR in each event window and their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values for Type1 
multiple announcement restatements. 
 








 [-4,-2]  [-1,+1]  [0, +1]  [-1, +1]  
Mean CAAR 0.0078 -0.0360 -0.0334 -0.0054 0.0292 -0.0432 
t-test p-value 0.7029 0.0804* 0.0208** 0.8982 0.4234 0.3056 
Median CAAR -0.0130 -0.0150 -0.0259 -0.0349 -0.0082 -0.0504 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.8886 0.0594* 0.0074*** 0.0950** 0.8247 0.0312** 
   Panel B: Mean and median AAR and their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values for each event day for Type1 
intention announcements.  
 Relative to the Intention announcement day 0 
 
[-1] [0] [+1] 
Mean AR -0.0026 -0.0223 -0.0109 
t-test p-value 08502 0.1200 0.4264 
Median AR -0.0014 -0.0141 <.0001 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.7792 0.0881* 0.9628 
 Panel C: Mean and median ∆Beta and their t test and Wilcoxon test p-values for the various categories.    
 
Caused by intention 
announcements 
Caused by final 
restatements 
Caused by entire multiple-
announcement restatements 
Mean ∆Beta 0.0650 -0.0110 -0.0146 
t-test p-value 0.8343 0.9790 0.9042 
Median ∆Beta 0.1088 -0.0994 -0.1023 
Wilcoxon test p-value 0.4964 0.6486 0.7396 
 
 
 
 
